Pacific Free Press was launched in March 2007 by Dutch-Canadian Richard
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the slag-heap of lies, ignorance and witless diversion that has buried
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For those still clinging to the remote hope that a political solution to America's wars could be finally broached by a newly emboldened and empowered Democratic party, last week's non-binding resolution on Iraq should prove a sufficiently pointed stake to drive through the heart of any surviving naivete. That the resolution failed to garner the 60% Senate support needed to move forward is the lesser failure; what this bit of mealy-mouthed, weedling legalese illustrates is the profound depth of America's moral paucity.
Iraq, when mentioned, is culprit, the author of its own disaster. As
though four years of military mayhem wrecked upon that benighted
country has nothing to do with the chaos Iraqis have come to know as
normal; as if the mass exodus of war refugees from the country, greater
in number than any other since the end of the second world war, has
nothing to do with the destruction of civil society; as though the
black operatives, mercenaries, and assorted scum collected from the
bottom of the empire's global barrel sent into Iraq to practice
Salvadorian and other "options" is not a factor in that chaos is beyond
acknowledgment. No, what is owned in this 97 word denial document is
this, and other similar sentiment:
"the situation in Iraq is damaging the standing, influence, and
interests of the United States in Iraq, the Middle East, and around the
world"
Here below then the text of the non-binding resolution on Iraq...
Following
is the text of the non-binding resolution on the Iraq war that the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved on Wednesday, January 24, 2007 by a 12-9
vote:
Expressing the bipartisan resolution on Iraq
Whereas
the United States strategy and presence on the ground in Iraq can only
be sustained with the support of the American people and bipartisan
support from Congress;
Whereas maximizing chances of success
in Iraq should be our goal, and the best chance of success requires a
change in current strategy;
Whereas the situation in Iraq is
damaging the standing, influence, and interests of the United States in
Iraq, the Middle East, and around the world;
Whereas more than
137,000 United States military personnel are bravely and honorably
serving in Iraq and deserve the support of all Americans;
Whereas
more than 3,000 United States military personnel have already lost
their lives in Iraq, and more than 22,500 have been wounded in Iraq;
Whereas
on January 10, 2007, President George W. Bush announced his plan to
deepen the United States military involvement in Iraq by deploying
approximately 21,000 additional United States combat forces to Iraq;
Whereas Iraq is witnessing widening sectarian and intra-sectarian violence;
Whereas
Iraqis must reach a political settlement if there is going to be a
reconciliation in Iraq, and the failure of the Iraqis to achieve such a
settlement has led to the increase in violence in Iraq;
Whereas
Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on November 27, 2006, that
'(t)he crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the cycle of
aggravation and bloodletting of innocents are the politicians.';
Whereas
an open-ended commitment of United States forces in Iraq is
unsustainable and a deterrent to the Iraqis making the political
compromises and providing the personnel and resources that are needed
for violence to end and for stability and security to be achieved in
Iraq;
Whereas the responsibility for internal security and
halting sectarian violence in Iraq must rest primarily with the
Government of Iraq and Iraqi security forces;
Whereas there
have been repeated promises by the Government of Iraq to assume a
greater share of security responsibilities, disband militias, consider
amendments to the Iraq constitution, enact laws to reconcile sectarian
differences, and improve the quality of life for the Iraqi people, but
those promises have not been kept;
Whereas a successful strategy in Iraq is dependent upon the Iraqi leaders fulfilling their promises;
Whereas
the commander of the United States Central Command, General John
Abizaid, testified to Congress on November 15, 2006, that '(i)t's easy
for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more
American forces prevent the Iraqis from taking more responsibility for
their own future';
Whereas the Iraq Study Group suggested a
comprehensive strategy to 'enable the United States to begin to move
its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly' based on 'new and enhanced
diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region';
Whereas
the United States Army and Marine Corps, including their Reserves and
the Army National Guard, their personnel, and their families, are under
enormous strain from multiple, extended deployments to Iraq and
Afghanistan;
Whereas the majority of nondeployed Army and
Marine Corps units are no longer combat ready due to a lack of
equipment and insufficient time to train; and
Whereas the
United States strategy in Iraq must not compromise the ability of the
United States to address other vital national security priorities, in
particular global terror networks, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, regional stability in the Middle East, the nuclear program
of Iran, the nuclear weapons of North Korea, and stability and security
in Afghanistan: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that
(1)
it is not in the national interest of the United States to deepen its
military involvement in Iraq, particularly by increasing the United
States military force presence in Iraq;
(2) the primary
objective of United States strategy in Iraq should be to have the Iraqi
political leaders make the political compromises necessary to end the
violence in Iraq;
(3) greater concerted regional, and
international support would assist the Iraqis in achieving a political
solution and national reconciliation;
(4) main elements of the
mission of United States forces in Iraq should transition to helping
ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq, conduct counterterrorism
activities, reduce regional interference in the internal affairs of
Iraq, and accelerate training of Iraqi troops;
(5) the United
States should transfer, under an appropriately expedited timeline,
responsibility for internal security and halting sectarian violence in
Iraq to the Government of Iraq and Iraqi security forces; and
(6)
the United States should engage nations in the Middle East to develop a
regional, internationally-sponsored peace and reconciliation process
for Iraq.