Pacific Free Press was launched in March 2007 by Dutch-Canadian Richard
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The mission of Pacific Free Press is simple: to dig out nuggets of truth from
the slag-heap of lies, ignorance and witless diversion that has buried
public discourse today. Pacific Free Press provides a new venue for
disseminating hard news and insightful, fact-based analysis of the
harsh realities too often ignored or distorted by the mainstream press.
Imperial Wizards: The Nangarhar Massacre and U.S. Plans for Central Asia
by Chris Floyd At first, the Pentagon denied that American planes had slaughtered dozens of Afghan civilians on their way to a wedding in the Nangarhar mountains.
"Pure propaganda," said the usual media and blogosphere sycophants. "It's always 'a wedding' being hit, the same old story."
The military brass promised the usual investigation, no doubt
hoping it would all go away. But then Afghan government officials
confirmed the truth, and the BBC's Alastair Leithead was the first
outsider to visit the actual site of the massacre:
"What began as celebration ended with maybe 52 people dead, most of them women and children, and others badly injured.
"The
US forces said they targeted insurgents in a strike. But from what I
saw with my own eyes and heard from the many mourners, no militants
were among the dead...
"It appears the wedding group was
crossing a narrow pass in the mountains which divides the valleys where
the two families live. From nowhere a fast jet flew low and dropped a
bomb right on top of the pass near a group of children who had
impatiently rushed ahead and were resting, waiting for the women to
catch up...
"But then [came] the second blast - the bomb had been
dropped on top of the women and almost all of them had been killed.
Three girls escaped, among them the bride, but as they ran down the
hillside a third bomb landed on top of them...
"The BBC team I
was with were the first outsiders to see where the bombs hit - even the
Afghan investigators did not climb up the steep mountainside - and
there was much evidence to support the story. The fact we could travel
to the area in local cars was proof that Taliban insurgents, al-Qaeda
operatives or foreign fighters were not present in the valley...
"Civilian
casualties are not new to Nangarhar province - last year a convoy of US
Marines was hit by a bomb attack and in the chaos they opened fire in a
bazaar killing 19 people. They were sent home and their officers
charged, but a subsequent ruling cleared them of any responsibility for
the deaths...
"Mirwais Yasini, a local MP and the deputy speaker
of Afghanistan's lower house, made the point that civilian casualties
widen the gap between the people and the government, and the
international forces...
"These mistakes are incredibly costly in
a counter-insurgency campaign which relies on winning people over, not
forcing them against the authorities. I wonder how many enemies have
been created in Nangarhar as a result of the latest bloodshed?"
Enemies like these, for example (from the NY Times' Carlotta Gall):
"Taliban
insurgents carried out a bold assault on a remote base near the border
with Pakistan on Sunday, NATO reported, and a senior American military
official said nine American soldiers were killed.
"The attack,
the worst against Americans in Afghanistan in three years, illustrated
the growing threat of Taliban militants and their associates, who in
recent months have made Afghanistan a far deadlier war zone for
American-led forces than Iraq...
"The militants have since
regained strength in the tribal areas of Pakistan, which they have
often used as a base for raids into Afghanistan, an increasingly sore
point for the American and Afghan governments."
The
militants have regained strength precisely because of incidents like
the Nangarhar Massacre -- incidents which are inevitable when you are
occupying a country by force. People flock back to the Taliban banner
because they are seeing their families slaughtered without mercy, and
without justice.
II.
But of course "Taliban" has become a
catch-all term for all armed resistance to the American-European
occupation: both because it is a handy scare-word that sets off
connotations with al Qaeda and 9/11, and because it obscures the true,
more complex nature of the insurgency. As US News reports, much of the
violent resistance in the eastern border area near Pakistan is led not
by adherents of the ousted Taliban regime but by extremist warlords
once in the pay of the United States:
"U.S. forces are keenly
aware that they are facing an increasingly complex enemy herewhat U.S.
military officials now call a syndicatecomposed not only of Taliban
fighters but also powerful warlords who were once on the payroll of the
Central Intelligence Agency. "You could almost describe the insurgency
as having two branches," says a senior U.S. military official here.
"It's the Taliban in the south and a 'rainbow coalition' in the east."
"Indeed,
along with a smattering of Afghan tribal groups, Pakistani extremists,
and drug kingpins, two of the most dangerous players are violent Afghan
Islamists named Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani, according
to U.S. officials. In recent weeks, Hekmatyar has called upon Pakistani
militants to attack U.S. targets, while the Haqqani network is blamed
for three large vehicle bombings, along with the attempted
assassination of Karzai in April.
"Ironically, these two
warlordscurrently at the top of America's list of most wanted men in
Afghanistanwere once among America's most valued allies. In the 1980s,
the CIA funneled hundreds of millions of dollars in weapons and
ammunition to help them battle the Soviet Army during its occupation of
Afghanistan. Hekmatyar, then widely considered by Washington to be a
reliable anti-Soviet rebel, was even flown to the United States by the
CIA in 1985."
Yes, Hekmatyar was one of the "freedom
fighters" so beloved by Ronald Reagan and the Bushes -- even though the
American leaders were well aware of the true nature of the sadistic,
woman-hating, obscurantist thugs they had hired to irritate the Soviets
in Afghanistan:
"In his early years, the warlord
distinguished himself by throwing acid in the faces of unveiled women.
Today, a senior defense official says Hekmatyar is "as vicious as they
come."
But of course he is no more vicious now than in
those "early years" when, while he was throwing acid in the faces of
unveiled women [and having recalcitrant minions torn apart by tying
them to tanks going in different directions], he was being financed and
feted by Reagan and Bush. Just as Saddam Hussein was no more vicious in
1991 -- or 2003 -- than he was when Reagan and Bush were plying him
with money, guns, WMD technology and military intelligence to guide his
chemical weapon attacks on Iran.
"U.S. officials had an
even higher opinion of Haqqani, who was considered the most effective
rebel warlord....Haqqani was also one of the leading advocates of the
so-called Arab Afghans, deftly organizing Arab volunteer fighters who
came to wage jihad against the Soviet Union and helping to protect
future al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden...
"Today, the Haqqani
network [now led by his son] is driving the recent rise in violence in
eastern Afghanistan, according to U.S. military officials. Haqqani "is
definitely the strongest" enemy in the border provinces of Paktia,
Paktika, and Khost, known among military officials as p2k.
III.
Of
course, some caution is always in order when dealing with the
statements of "U.S. military officials." No doubt there is a great deal
of savage mischief being wrought by the ex-CIA warlords. [Or are they
really "ex"? Are they still being run, by one bloc or another in the
vast labyrinth of America's security apparat? Probably not -- but there
is absolutely no way to be sure, not in a "National Security State,"
where a myriad of unaccountable agencies and secret armies ply their
black ops with off-the-books billions.] And it's always good to see any
mainstream media report that provides more nuance to the fairy tale of
the "Good War" in Afghanistan. But the emphasis on the warlord's
Pakistan connection plays into the PR push now under way to prepare the
ground for an extension of the war into Pakistan's western frontier.
The
Central Asian region has been roiled with anxiety in the last week
following an unscheduled visit to Pakistan by U.S. Joint Chiefs honcho
Admiral Mike Mullen -- believed by some normally astute observers to be
one of the "grown-ups," like Pentagon chief Robert Gates, who have
allegedly outfought the bellicose Cheney faction in the Bush
Administration and are now keeping us safe from an expansion of the
Terror War into Iran. And there may even be a kernel of truth to the
view that Mullen and Gates oppose an attack on Iran -- for tactical,
not moral reasons, of course. (Which was precisely how former CENTCOM
chief William Fallon -- often depicted as some kind of anti-war "hero,"
even as he directed Terror War fronts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia
-- looked at it. As Fallon said about the human beings in Iran: "These
guys are ants. When the time comes, you crush them." It's the timing --
not the justice -- of an attack on Iran that concerns the "grown-ups.")
But
if the "grown-ups" are leery of attacking Iran at the moment, they seem
eager -- or at least very willing -- to expand the Terror War into
Pakistan. (Grown-up Barack Obama is also on board with this idea.) As
Gall notes, it was grown-up Gates, at the express order of George W.
Bush, who told grown-up Mullen to go to Pakistan to lean on the new
government to bring the "havens" on the western frontier to heel -- or
else.
Yet an attack on nuclear-armed Pakistan could have even
more catastrophic effects than a strike on nuke-less Iran. An American
incursion is adamantly opposed by almost every faction in Pakistan, and
would certainly unleash a nationalist backlash of tremendous fury, and
fan the flames of extremism into a conflagration.
Pakistan is
already reeling from years of authoritarian rule by Bush's client
dictator, Pervez Musharraf, along with the collapse of hopes raised by
the recent democratic elections. The new government, led by the party
of assassinated faction leader Benazir Bhutto, has quickly sunk into
corruption, as well as reneging on earnest promises to restore the rule
of law. As Tariq Ali reports in the London Review of Books (payment
required for the full article):
"The immediate impact of the
stunning electoral defeat suffered by General Musharrafs political
party and his factotums was to dispel the disillusionment of the
citizenry. Not for long. Musharraf is still clinging on to the
presidency; [Bhutto's husband, Asif] Zardari is running the government
with the help of his old cronies; the judges dismissed by Musharraf
have still not been reinstated; the economy is a mess; and the US Air
Force has started dropping bombs on the North-West Frontier Province
again...
"Five months on, democratic fervour, or naivety, has
turned to anger. Old Corruption is back. The country is in the grip of
a food and power crisis. Inflation is approaching 15 per cent. The
price of gas (used for cooking in many homes) has risen by 30 per cent
and the price of wheat by more than 20 per cent since November 2007.
Food and commodity prices are rising all over the world, but there is
an additional problem in Pakistan: too much wheat is being smuggled
into Afghanistan to feed the Nato armies...
"[Another] major
problem confronting the government was the Nato occupation of
Afghanistan... In March, Admiral Olson, the head of the US Special
Operations Command, arrived in Islamabad for consultations with the
Pakistan military and surprised locals by demanding a meeting with the
countrys elected leaders. Olson asked the politicians how they would
respond to the US need to make cross-border incursions into Pakistan.
The Pakistanis made their opposition clear. The most senior civil
servant in the Frontier Province, Khalid Aziz, told Olson that it
would be extremely dangerous. It would increase the number of
militants, it would be . . . a war of liberation for the Pashtuns. They
would say: We are being slaughtered. Our enemy is the United States.
"...Two
leaders of the ANP [the secular party that defeated the Islamists in
the frontier province during the elections], Asfandyar Khan and
Afrasiab Khattak, were summoned to Washington for meetings with Stephen
Hadley, the national security adviser, and John Negroponte. There was
only one issue on the agenda: cross-border raids. Washington was
determined to find Pakistani politicians who would defend them. The ANP
leaders refused. We told them physical intervention into the tribal
areas by the United States would be a blunder, Khattak later told the
New York Times. It would create an atmosphere in which the terrorists
would rally popular support.
"...Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Natos
secretary-general, [implied to] the Brookings Institution in February
that the continuing occupation had less to do with good governance than
with the desire to site permanent military bases (and nuclear
missiles?) in a country that borders China, Iran and Central Asia.
Contributors to the organisations house magazine, Nato Review, have
argued that the preservation of Western hegemony in the Asia-Pacific
region requires a permanent military presence.
Confirmation
for this aim can be found in Monday's Washington Post, which buried an
article on a funding bill passed by Congress for bolstering the key
American base in Bagram. The Pentagon has been forthright in its view
of the base's permanent importance. As the WP notes, the funding
request states clearly that "as a forward operating site, Bagram must
be able to provide for a long term, steady state presence which is able
to surge to meet theater contingency requirements."
And that
anti-war hero Admiral Fallon was even more up-front about the base's
long-term imperial function, calling Bagram "the centerpiece for the
CENTCOM Master Plan for future access to and operations in Central
Asia." The American military intends to have a "forward presence" in
Central Asia for a long, long time.
Ali continues:
"There
are three interrelated power blocs in Pakistan. Of these the US lobby
is the most influential, the most public and the most hated. It is
currently running the country. The Saudis, who use a combination of
wealth and religion to get their way, are second in the pecking order
and less unpopular. The Chinese lobby is virtually invisible, never
interferes in internal politics and for that reason is immensely
respected, especially within the army; but it is also the least
powerful outside military circles. In Cold War times, the interests of
the three lobbies coincided. Not now. The War on Terror has changed all
that.
"What is missing is a Pakistan lobby, a strong group within
the ruling class that puts the interests and needs of the country and
its citizens above all else. A survey carried out in May for the New
America Foundation revealed that... 52 per cent regard the United
States as responsible for the violence in Pakistan; that 74 per cent
oppose the War on Terror in Afghanistan. A majority favours a
negotiated settlement with the Taliban; 80 per cent hold the government
and local businessmen responsible for food scarcity; only 11 per cent
see India as the main enemy."
When you consider that the
world is still reverberating from the enormous blowback of the American
intervention in the region almost 30 years ago -- when Jimmy Carter and
Obama advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski began building the jihad army that
Reagan and Bush greatly expanded -- the extent and duration of the
blowback from a "surge" into Pakistan is incalculable. Yet the
grown-ups of our bipartisan foreign policy establishment seem
increasingly inclined to "project dominance" into this volatile
situation, where the United States is already hated, launching yet
another cycle of violence, chaos, and suffering.
Death will
yet have many more brides -- and an endless brood of children -- as the
empire sinks its boots deeper into the soil of Central Asia.