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Torture from the Top Down
by Scott Horton In a series of hearings, Congressional leaders are trying to get to the bottom of a few simple questions: Who initiated the use of torture techniques in the “war on terror”? What was the process by which it was done? On whose authority was it done?
William J. Haynes II
The use of torture techniques became a matter of public knowledge four years ago. In response to the initial disclosures, the Bush Administration first decided to spin the fable of a handful of “rotten apples” inside of a company of military police from Appalachia and scapegoated a handful of examples in carefully managed and staged show trials.
When further disclosures out of Bagram and Guantánamo made this untenable, they spun a new myth, this time suggesting that the administration had responded to a plea from below for wider latitude.
In fact at this point the evidence is clear and convincing, and
it points to a top-down process. Figures near the top of the
administration decided that they wanted brutal techniques and they
hammered them through, usually over strong opposition from the ranks of
professionals.
Yesterday’s hearings in
the Senate Armed Services Committee helped make that point, and brought
a new focus on a figure who has been lurking in the shadows of the
controversy for some time: William J. Haynes II, Rumsfeld’s lawyer and
now a lawyer for Chevron. Two things emerge from the hearing. First,
that Haynes was effectively a stationmaster when it came to introducing
torture techniques in the “war on terror,” circumventing opposition
from career military and pushing through a policy of brutality and
cruelty, by stealth when necessary. And second, that Haynes lacks the
courage of his convictions, a willingness to stand up and testify
honesty about what he did.
So frequent in fact were Haynes’s
failures of recollection that he appears ready to challenge the former
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales for the distinction of having the
most comprehensive and convenient memory loss of any recent government
official. And, as is the case with Gonzales, speculation is starting to
build over whether Haynes will be the subject of a probe over his
statements to Congress which cannot be squared with the extrinsic
evidence or recollections of others.
In some areas Haynes’s
memory lapses follow a familiar pattern. He doesn’t want to recall
having seen, discussed, or drawn upon the celebrated “torture”
memorandum of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel.
That’s curious, particularly since the language and reasoning of that
memorandum pervade virtually everything he did.
Moreover, one witness
has described in hushed tones how Haynes kept a copy of this memorandum
in a vault in his office, removing it to examine like Torquemada’s Holy
Grail whenever he needed nourishment in his quest for official cruelty.
This man appears to be feverishly covering something up, wary all the
while that he may be fated to be the target of a criminal
investigation. Memory lapses were, alas, the sole tactical option
available to him. “Abu Ghraib? Don’t remember that” quipped Dana
Milbank this morning in the Washington Post. That sums up the Haynes
testimony nicely. And the ironies were not lost on Milbank:
In
two hours of testimony, Haynes managed to get off no fewer than 23
don’t recalls, 22 don’t remembers, 16 don’t knows, and various other
protestations of memory loss. It was an impressive performance, to be
sure. But let’s see him try to do that with a hood over his head,
standing on a crate with wires attached to his arms.
Torquemada
would have called that “putting the question” to Haynes. I don’t
approve of that tactic, so let’s help Haynes out. What is he forgetting?
Of
course, he’s forgetting that the whole push to introduce torture at
Guantánamo started with the War Council in which he and David Addington
played such a central role. And he’s forgetting the key role played by
Vice President Cheney and David Addington, his mentors, who raised him
from obscurity when they decided to elevate a retiring Army captain to
be general counsel of the Army. (Haynes’s utter fidelity to his masters
is impressive, and yesterday it showed. Fidelity requires the code of
omertà.) He forgot his visit in September 2002 to Guantánamo with the
rest of his War Council, a most convenient memory failure about which
Philippe Sands confronted him during their interview. The minutes of
that visit point to many private discussions between Haynes and the
Guantánamo commander. Haynes doesn’t recall those, either, but
immediately after them, the process of preparing requests for highly
coercive techniques begins. Haynes wants us to consider this a
coincidence. Experience teaches otherwise.
And he’s forgotten
all about the push from the top, originating in his office, to have the
SERE (“Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape”) techniques studied as
a basis for new “gloves off” interrogation techniques. Haynes had his
deputy, Richard Shiffrin, launch a dialogue with SERE trainers about
techniques that could be derived from their training program. This is
the path by which waterboarding and a number of other illegal
techniques made their passage into the interrogator’s repertoire, first
for the CIA and later for the military. In July 2005, Jane Mayer
reported on this in a New Yorker article, and yesterday her work was
validated through disclosure of the paper trail.
He’s forgotten
about the ferocious opposition to these practices that sprung up within
the military, starting with the Navy’s General Counsel, Alberto Mora,
and spreading to the leadership of the JAG Corps.
But most
curiously, he’s forgotten all about the role played by the Justice
Department and its Office of Legal Counsel. He’s forgotten about the
torture memo itself. Why? The August 2002 torture memo is a smoking gun
that shows torture being introduced top-down, as a project of the
Cheney–Addington team of which Jim Haynes was a proud member. It
refutes the whole administration narrative about torture practices
coming on the strength of an appeal from below. And it puts the lie to
John Yoo’s claims never to have influenced the abuses that occurred in
the field in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in Guantánamo. In fact the
Yoo–Bybee memorandum unleashed the abuses, and was used by Jim Haynes
just for that purpose. Once more, Jim Haynes is protecting his friends
and protecting himself. Once more, Haynes gives not the candor and
openness he owes to a Congressional oversight body, but the code of
silence that more typically binds the participants in a criminal scheme.
Haynes
has been described as an inspirational leader, with the photogenic
appearance of a movie star. But it’s interesting to note the sort of
conduct he inspires. The most telling document to emerge in yesterday’s
hearing are the notes of a meeting at Guantánamo convened in the wake
of Haynes’s visit to discuss implementation of the “tough stuff.” The
Yoo-Bybee torture memorandum is discussed at length, and its rationale
is drawn out. And the reaction? “We’ll need documentation to protect
us,” said Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver.
“Yes, if someone dies while
aggressive techniques are being used, regardless of cause of death, the
backlash of attention would be severely detrimental. Everything must be
approved and documented” said CIA lawyer John Fredman (now serving as a
legal advisor to the Director of National Intelligence).
But Fredman’s
concerns were clearly addressed by the Bush Administration, because
many people did die in detention, in conditions connected to the
application of torture techniques (there are at least a dozen such
cases already documented), and in none of these cases has a responsible
person been punished. Did the Bush Administration ultimately decide
that homicide was not a problem, either? Or perhaps it was concern
about the information that would come to the surface if a prosecution
were to be undertaken.
Yes, the conversation starts with wide
recognition that the techniques which were to be introduced were
criminal under federal law. And it progresses to concern about avoiding
criminal liability. Throughout the documents, military officers recite
the litany of reasons why these techniques should not be used. They
seem to expect that the matter will work its way up to senior levels
and be shot down. There is a sort of horror in the creeping recognition
of the moral and ethical vacuum that has taken hold at the highest
echelons of government.
Career military leaders mustered a
catalog of objections to the torture techniques that Haynes and his
team crammed down on the military. But it started with enlightened
self-interest, the recognition that the decision to introduce torture
would be a tactical victory of the highest order for the nation’s foes
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Before Haynes spoke, an individual appeared
who was Haynes’s diametric opposite in candor and forthrightness. It
was Alberto Mora, general counsel of the Navy. Here were his comments:
And the questioning of Jim Haynes? Yesterday was a modest start. The process has only just begun.
Writings 
In a series of hearings, Congressional leaders are trying to get to the bottom of a few simple questions: Who initiated the use of torture techniques in the “war on terror”? What was the process by which it was done? On whose authority was it done?
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