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by Elizabeth de la Vega Ninety-seven years ago this month, just eight days after the March 25, 1911, Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire , in which nearly 150 young men and women suffered horrific deaths, Rose Schneiderman rocked the Metropolitan Opera House.
She was not singing. But her voice, pellucid and sharp, carried the house:
"I would be a traitor to these poor burned bodies if I came here to talk good fellowship. We have tried you good people of the public and we have found you wanting."
Who was Rose Schneiderman? She was, in the words of Frances
Perkins (who later became Franklin D. Roosevelt's labor secretary): "an
unknown little girl." It was a realistic - not unkind - description of
this factory worker, who earned a paltry $5.00 a week for grueling
ten-hour days spent sewing linings into golf hats. To the indifferent
eyes shaded by those natty caps, the Polish immigrant with a
sixth-grade education was almost certainly invisible, or, at best, a
curiosity to be observed on a Sunday afternoon East Side-slumming tour.
On Sunday, April 2, however, all eyes were riveted upon the 29-year-old
labor organizer with "fiery red hair" who was commanding the Opera
House stage.
The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory building, it
had been said, was fireproof. And so it was: The structure survived
unscathed. The people inside, however, did not. The owners had cut
costs by packing seamstresses and chain-smoking fabric cutters into a
cramped wood space, eschewing rudimentary procedures necessary to avoid
the accumulation of flammable oily rags and littered fabric. Even
worse, to avoid the theft of an odd scrap of lace or ribbon, they had
locked all but one door to streamline the bosses' daily inspection of
pockets and handbags on the employees' way out. So, when the inevitable
conflagration began, the mostly teenaged workers - for some of whom the
only identifiable remains were their engagement rings (14 in all) - had
no way out. They were left to roast to death or hurtle themselves to
the pavement.
Suddenly humanitarians after this tragedy, the
same Gilded-Age revelers who had caroused through the East Side as if
it were Disneyland were moved to donate to Red Cross victims' funds.
Schneiderman was having none of it. It was much too late to offer "a
couple of dollars for the sorrowing mothers, brothers and sisters by
way of a charity gift." It was also, she reminded them:
"[n]ot
the first time girls have been burned alive in the city. Every week I
must learn of the untimely death of one of my sister workers. Every
year thousands of us are maimed. The life of men and women is so cheap
and property is so sacred."
Certainly, much has improved for
factory workers since 1911. But, as workers at the Imperial Sugar Co.
in Port Wentworth, Georgia, could attest, life is still cheap and
property is still sacred. On February 8, 2008, 12 employees there were
burned to death and dozens more critically injured because Republicans
are committed to making sure no pesky regulations upset that perverse
calculation - regardless of the human suffering it entails.
In the early 1900s, as a former New York City fire chief testified
regarding factory conditions after the Triangle fire, there was "nobody
responsible for anything." Now, of course, we have an office - the
Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA) - that is at least
putatively responsible for workplace safety. Specifically, OSHA is
legislatively mandated to (1) enact industrial standards for toxic
substance exposure and site protection; and (2) conduct inspections to
ensure those standards are followed.
Unfortunately, OSHA
started becoming anemic during the 1990s, and now it is positively
spectral. With fewer employees than it had 30 years ago, yet twice the
number of workplaces in its charge, OSHA would need 133 years to
inspect every business over which it has jurisdiction.
The
far more serious problem with OSHA's performance, however, is that,
under the Bush administration, it has deliberately avoided setting any
significant industrial standards. (To be precise, it has set one,
regarding the permissible level of workplace exposure to the known
carcinogen hexavalent chromium, but only after a court ordered it to do
so.)
OSHA's abdication of its duties is not a matter of
incompetence. It is, as Rep. John Barrows (D-Georgia) pointed out in a
March 12, 2008, Workforce Protections Subcommittee Hearing of the
House, Education and Labor Committee, a purposeful unwillingness to
act. Or, to put it more colorfully, as Barrows did:
"When you've
got an agency that don't know its job or don't care about its job, or
has all kinds of reasons for not doin' its job, it's a little bit like
goin' bird huntin' and havin' to tote the dog."
OSHA's failure to enact mandatory standards has not only been fatal to its mission; it has been fatal to the workers.
The Imperial Sugar refinery disaster, for example, followed a
long-known pattern of explosions involving finely powdered and,
therefore, highly combustible materials, such as chemicals, flour,
metals and, of course, sugar. As William Wright, interim executive of
the US Chemical Safety Board (CSB), explained at the March 12 Workforce
Protections Subcommittee hearing, witnesses familiar with the Port
Wentworth facility described seeing snow-like piles of accumulated
sugar dust on floor joists, pipes and equipment. When this highly
combustible powder was dislodged by an as-yet-unknown event, it fueled
the massive explosion and fire.
Like so many factory fires
before it, the Imperial Sugar Co. catastrophe was both predictable and
preventable. In 2006, the CSB, after identifying 281 combustible dust
fires responsible for 119 deaths and numerous injuries, formally urged
OSHA to immediately establish mandatory combustible dust hazard
regulations.
This report was not a news flash to OSHA. The
year before, OSHA itself had issued a bulletin entitled "Combustible
Dust in Industry: Preventing and Mitigating the Effects of Fire and
Explosions," which had detailed a gruesome history of catastrophic
explosions resulting from combustible dust and suggested procedures for
prevention of future similar disasters. OSHA emphasized, however, the
procedures were not mandatory. Failure to follow them would not be a
basis for any adverse action whatsoever:
"This Safety and Health
Information Bulletin is not a standard or regulation, and it creates no
new legal obligations. The Bulletin is advisory in nature,
informational in content, and is intended to assist employers in
providing a safe and healthful workplace."
After the CSB issued
its report in 2006, did OSHA decide to put some teeth into its
recommendations? No. It established a National Emphasis Program to
further encourage voluntary employer action.
What about now,
after yet another disaster caused by combustible dust? Well, according
to Director Edwin Foulkes, OSHA is "saddened by the tragic loss of life
that resulted from the Imperial Sugar explosion [and] will not rest
until we ensure that all employees go home safely to their families and
friends at the end of every work day." So concerned is Foulkes that he
has, on behalf of OSHA, sent out a very large number of letters -
300,000 to be exact - reminding employers about dust hazards.
Foulkes has also promised to investigate the issue of mandatory
combustible dust standards, but we should not expect those any time
soon. Why? Because, as the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory owners
discovered when they were acquitted of manslaughter charges after the
fire, the best way to avoid criminal liability for even the most
egregious workplace malfeasance is not to have any laws at all. Despite
infuriating testimony about previous warnings and blocked egress, the
jury was unable to find owners Isaac Harris and Max Blenck had violated
or failed to comply with any legal requirements: There weren't any.
It was a perfect void of government responsibility. And it is into this
very same early-twentieth-century abyss the Bush administration has
been dragging us for the past seven years. No regulations, ergo, no
violations. No violations, ergo, no criminal culpability. Employers -
unfettered by oversight or even laws - can live free and profit.
Employees, on the other hand, can live free and die. Meanwhile,
however, charitable donations continue to pour in for the families of
the Imperial Sugar Co. victims who have been killed or maimed as the
result of this unconscionable bargain.
A century has passed
since Rose Schneiderman rebuked the citizens at the Metropolitan Opera
House in the wake of the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire, but were she
alive today, I have no doubt that we would again be found wanting.
Elizabeth de la Vega is a former federal prosecutor with more than 20
years of experience. During her tenure, she was a member of the
Organized Crime Strike Force and chief of the San Jose Branch of the US
attorney's office for the Northern District of California. Her pieces
have appeared in a variety of print and online publications including
Truthout, TomDispatch.com, The Nation, The Los Angeles Times, Salon,
Mother Jones and The Christian Science Monitor. The author of "United
States v. George W. Bush et al," she may be contacted at
ElizabethdelaVega@Verizon.net or through Speakers Clearinghouse.