If the claims of modern professional journalism are to be
believed, the similarities should be few and far between. Soviet-era
media such as Pravda (meaning, ironically, "The Truth") are a byword
for state-controlled mendacity in the West. Thus Simon Jenkins
commented in the Times in the 1980s: "There is a smack of Pravda about
this pious self-censorship." (Jenkins, 'A new name on the tin mug of
scandal,' The Times, March 19, 1989)
Doris Lessing, recent winner of the Nobel Prize for literature, wrote in 1992:
"Even
five, six years ago, Izvestia, Pravda and a thousand other Communist
papers were written in a language that seemed designed to fill up as
much space as possible without actually saying anything. Because, of
course, it was dangerous to take up positions that might have to be
defended. Now all these newspapers have rediscovered the use of
language. But the heritage of dead and empty language these days is to
be found in academia, and particularly in some areas of sociology and
psychology." (Lessing, 'Questions you should never ask a writer,' New
York Times, October 13, 2007. Originally published June 26, 1992)
This
standard Western association of thought control with totalitarian
societies is a red herring. In fact, thought control is far more
characteristic of 'democratic' societies - where state violence is no
longer an option, propaganda comes into its own.
After all, it
is a remarkable fact that our society never discusses the possibility
that a corporate media system monitoring a society dominated by large
corporations might be something other than free, open and honest.
Consider Lessing's analysis in the light of these comments from media
analyst Danny Schechter:
"We are bombarded with information,
although if you look closely, most of it has a similar grammar, a
similar focus and similar sources, all revolving around institutions
and topics that most viewers admit in survey after survey they don't
really understand." (Schechter, The More You Watch The Less You Know,
Seven Stories Press, 1997, p.43)
Verbiage "designed to fill up
as much space as possible without actually saying anything", in other
words, because it is "dangerous to take up positions that might have to
be defended".
How "dangerous"? David Barsamian recently asked
Noam Chomsky why one regular New York Times commentator refused to
recognise blindingly obvious truths embarrassing to US power. Chomsky
responded:
"If he wrote that, then he wouldn't be writing for
the New York Times. There is a certain discipline that you have to
meet. In a well-run society, you don't say things you know. You say
things that are required for service to power." (Chomsky, What We Say
Goes, Penguin, 2007, p.2)
We are very grateful to Nikolai Lanine
for agreeing to co-author this piece and for his hard work over several
months in making it possible. All quotations from the Soviet press
archives were translated from the original by him. We are also grateful
to Noam Chomsky who originally put us in touch with Nikolai.
A Humanitarian War of Self-Defence
Inspired
by the success of the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, US-backed Afghan
militants - including future founders of the Taliban movement - stepped
up their attacks on Afghan government forces in the late 1970s.
Fearful
of the "threat to the security of [the Soviet] southern
boarders"(Lyahovsky & Zabrodin, Secrets of the Afghan War, 1991,
p.48) and concerned that the conflict might spread to neighbouring
Soviet republics - and so risk radicalising their dominantly Muslim
populations (accounting for more than 20% of the Soviet population) -
the Soviet government invaded. The invasion was a straightforward act
of aggression, an attempt to crush a perceived threat to Soviet
security and power.
Inevitably, the Soviet government portrayed
its invasion as an act of humanitarian intervention initiated at the
"request of the [Afghan] government". (Pravda, April 27, 1980) The aim
was "to prevent the establishment of... a terrorist regime and to
protect the Afghan people from genocide", and also to provide "aid in
stabilising the situation and the repulsion of possible external
aggression". (Lyahovsky & Zabrodin, p.48)
Once the
"terrorists" had been defeated, Afghanistan would be left to become "a
stable, friendly country". The invasion, then, was in the best
interests of the Afghan people - the focus of the Soviet government's
benevolent concern.
The Soviet media presented the invasion
essentially as a peacekeeping operation intended to prevent enemy
atrocities. Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], a major Soviet military
newspaper, reported in May 1985:
"Since the establishment of
this [Soviet] base, [the Mujahadeen]'s predatory extortions, violence,
[and] reprisals have stopped; and poor peasants are [now] working the
land peacefully." (Krasnaya Zvezda, May 1, 1985)
The same paper noted:
"Before
the arrival of the Soviet soldiers here, [the area] was literally
swarming with [insurgents]... [who] were ruthlessly killing...
everyone, who was desperately longing for a new life... However, Soviet
soldiers arrived, and life in the district has started normalising."
(Krasnaya Zvezda, October 27, 1985)
Voenni Vestnik [Military
Bulletin] took it for granted that "...[Soviet] paratroopers are
protecting peaceful [Afghan] citizens". (Voenni Vestnik #4, 1983)
This,
of course, was a reversal of the truth that the Soviet superpower was
killing large numbers of civilians and causing great suffering to the
population.
Pravda insisted that the Afghan army had conducted
military operations "at the demand of the local population" and because
of "the danger to lives and property of citizens" posed by the
resistance. (Pravda, February 7, 1988)
Military personnel
constantly echoed government claims that intervention was required "to
help the hapless Afghan people to defend their freedom, their future".
(Krasnaya Zvezda, January 5, 1988)
The invasion was also
portrayed as an act of self-defence to prevent a "neighboring country
with a shared Soviet-Afghan border... [from turning] into a bridgehead
for... [Western] aggression against the Soviet state". (Izvestiya,
January 1, 1980) Soviet intervention was also a response to unprovoked
violence by Islamic fundamentalists (described as "freedom fighters" in
the West), who, it was claimed, planned to export their fundamentalist
struggle across the region "'under the green banner of Jihad', to the
territory of the Soviet Central-Asian republics". (Lyahovsky &
Zabrodin, p.45) The Soviet public were told they faced a stark choice:
either fight the menace abroad, or do nothing and later face a much
greater threat on home soil that would, geopolitically, "put the USSR
in a very difficult situation". (Sovetskaya Rossia [Soviet Russia],
February 11, 1993)
This theme was endlessly stressed by the
Soviet media system - Soviet forces were "not only defending Afghan
villages. They keep the peace on the borders of [our] homeland".
(Pravda, April 2, 1987) The goal was "peace and security in the region,
and also the security of the southern border of the USSR".
(Mezhdunarodnyi Ezhegodnik, 1981, p.224) The unquestioned assumption
was that Soviet forces had no option but to act "pre-emptively" in
"self-defence".
Reading Soviet propaganda on these themes inevitably recalls Tony Blair's famous assertion:
"What
does the whole of our history teach us, I mean British history in
particular? That if when you're faced with a threat you decide to avoid
confronting it short term, then all that happens is that in the longer
term you have to confront it and confront it an even more deadly form."
(ITN News at 6:30, January 31, 2003)
To this day, many former
Soviet military and media commentators continue to reinforce similar
claims. Former top Soviet military adviser in Afghanistan, General
Mahmut Gareev, writes in his book "My Last War" (1996) that the
"situation in Afghanistan was of great importance" for the security of
the Soviet state (p.363). The "high political, military and strategic
interests of the USSR demanded certain actions and decisions". (p.36)
The Soviet leadership was "aware that events in the south of the
country were exceptionally important and had great significance for the
security of the Soviet state. It was impossible not to react". (p.35-36)
After
the 1979 invasion, the Afghan insurgency repeatedly launched attacks on
border areas, including rocket strikes on Soviet towns. Ignoring the
fact that these attacks were a +response+ to Soviet aggression, the
Soviet media described them as "provocative criminal acts against the
Soviet territory". (Izvestiya, April 20, 1987)
For Democracy And Human Rights - America And Britain Attack
In
near-identical fashion, the British and American governments have
presented their invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as acts of
self-defence which also happen to be in the best interests of the
Afghan and Iraqi populations.
In 2001, the then UK defence
secretary Geoff Hoon insisted that, in Afghanistan, Britain "was acting
in self-defence against Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qa'ida network".
(Ben Russell, 'Parliament - terrorism debate,' The Independent,
November 2, 2001)
As with the Soviet media, the self-defensive,
humanitarian intent behind both invasions are staples of much US-UK
media reporting. On the April 12, 2005 edition of the BBC's Newsnight
programme, diplomatic editor Mark Urban discussed the significance of a
lessening of Iraqi attacks on US forces since January:
"It is
indeed the first real evidence that President Bush's grand design of
toppling a dictator and forcing a democracy into the heart of the
Middle East could work." (Urban, Newsnight, BBC2, April 12, 2005)
When
George Bush declared: "we are not conquerors; we're liberators", he
could have been quoting one of the top Soviet generals in Afghanistan,
who said:
"We didn't set ourselves the task of conquering anyone: we wanted to stabilise the situation." (Varennikov, CNN Interview, 1998)
In April 2002, Rory Carroll wrote in the Guardian:
"Whoever
is trying to destabilise Afghanistan is doing a good job. The broken
cities and scorched hills so recently liberated are rediscovering fear
and uncertainty." (Carroll, 'Blood-drenched warlord's return,' The
Observer, April 14, 2002)
The point being that, for Carroll, as for George Bush, Afghanistan really had been "liberated" by the world's superpower.
The New York Times wrote in September 2007:
"Military
statistics show that U.S. forces have made some headway at protecting
the Iraqi population, but there are questions over whether the gains
can be sustained." (Michael R. Gordon, 'Assessing the "surge",' New
York Times, September 8, 2007)
Even in reporting that a large
proportion of world opinion wants to see the US leave Iraq, the BBC
managed to boost the claimed humanitarian intent:
"Some 39% of
people in 22 countries said troops should leave now, and 28% backed a
gradual pull-out. Just 23% wanted them to stay until Iraq was safe."
(Most people 'want Iraq pull-out,'
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/6981553.stm,
September 7, 2007)
The idea that Iraq might not be safe +until+
US-UK troops leave, is unthinkable to many Western journalists, as it
was to Soviet journalists.
In some cases, Western reporting
perhaps even surpassed Soviet propaganda. As US tanks entered Baghdad
on April 9, 2003, ITN's John Irvine declared:
"A war of three weeks has brought an end to decades of Iraqi misery." (ITN Evening News, April 9, 2003)
The
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States were in
response to decades of US-UK violence, and support for violence, in the
Middle East. For what it's worth, Osama bin Laden specifically cited
Western oppression in Palestine, Western sanctions against Iraq, and US
bases in Saudi Arabia, as reasons for the attacks. And yet, as in the
Soviet case, US-UK aggression in Afghanistan and Iraq was justified as
a response to attacks that were "unprovoked". Blair even cited the 9/11
attacks as evidence to this effect on the grounds that the attacks had
taken place long before the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
In both the
West and the USSR, the occupations were, and are, presented as
fundamentally well-intentioned acts motivated by rational fears and
humanitarian aspirations.
In Accordance With International Law
According
to the Soviet government, the 1979 invasion was justified by
international law (Pravda, December 31, 1979; Gareev, 1996, p.40) and
was "in complete accordance with... the 1978 Soviet-Afghan Treaty".
(Izvestiya, January 1, 1980) The Soviet state had to honour its
obligations "to provide armed support to the Afghan national army".
(Lyahovsky & Zabrodin, p.47)
In 1988, Izvestiya quoted general Boris Gromov, the commander of Soviet troops in Afghanistan:
"We
came to Afghanistan at the end of 1979 at the request of the lawful
government [of Afghanistan] and in accordance with the agreement
between our countries based on the... Charter of the United Nations."
(Izvestiya, July 2, 1988)
Soviet journalists consistently
supported these claims. Pravda and Izvestiya wrote in 1980 that Soviet
forces were in Afghanistan "at the request of the [Afghan] government
with the only goal to protect the friendly Afghan people" (Pravda,
March 16, 1980) and "to help [this] neighbouring country... to repel
external aggression". (Izvestiya, January 3, 1980)
Such views
were frequently expressed by Soviet elites and mainstream journalists.
The 1980 issue of International Annual: Politics and Economics,
published by the Soviet Academy of Science, observed that the Afghan
government "repeatedly asked the USSR" to provide "military aid". The
"Soviet government granted the [Afghan] request, and the limited
contingent of Soviet troops was sent into the country," Mezhdunarodnyi
Ezhegodnik noted (1980, p.208). Such actions were entirely in
accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and Article 4 of the
[Soviet-Afghan] Treaty of December 5, 1978, Ezhegodnik added. (1981,
p.224)
Soviet leaders and commentators criticised and debated,
not the fundamental +illegality+ of the invasion, but the merit of the
+strategies+ for achieving its goals.
Soviet Chief of General
Staff Ogarkov argued in 1979 (before the invasion), that the decision
to send troops to Afghanistan was "inexpedient" because the initial
invasion force of 75,000 was insufficient to the task, which was to
"stabilise the situation in Afghanistan." It was "impossible to achieve
this goal with such a [small] force", he claimed. (Quoted, Lyahovsky
& Zabrodin, 1991, p.59). General Gareev, a top Soviet advisor to
the Afghan armed forces, argued in his memoirs that "from the military
point of view, it was perhaps more advisable to conduct a more massive
and powerful invasion of Afghanistan". (Gareev, 1996, pp.45-46)
In
the 1980s, the invasion was seen by many Russians as a "mistake" rather
than a crime. The attack was deemed legal and well-intentioned, but
poorly executed and at excessive cost to the +Soviets+ - a view that is
commonly held to this day. Apart from extremely rare exceptions
describing Soviet "participation in the Afghan war" as "criminal" (Trud
[Labour] newspaper, January 22, 1992), the invasion has almost never
been described as an act of Soviet aggression.
When the US and
UK governments talk of their "just cause" in Afghanistan they are
essentially repeating the Soviet newspaper Izvestiya which quoted an
Afghan official declaring that the Soviet and Afghan soldiers were
fighting "for a just cause and happy new life for all Afghan people".
(Izvestiya, January 14, 1986)
Similarly, and almost exactly echoing Izvestiya, an Observer editorial commented in October 2006:
"The
UK has responsibilities to the elected democratic government of Iraq,
under a UN mandate. Britain must honour its commitments to its partners
in Baghdad and in Washington." (Leader, 'Blair should heed the
general's reality check,' The Observer, October 15, 2006)
While
the manifest illegality of the 2003 Iraq invasion is presented by
newspapers like the Observer as a kind of initial teething problem
rendered irrelevant by a subsequent "UN mandate", former UN
secretary-general Kofi Annan takes a different view:
"The
Security Council's mandate was for us to help the Iraqi people. I don't
think one can say that the Security Council sanctioned the occupation
of Iraq, it merely noted the occupation of Iraq and asked the UN to
help the Iraqi people..." (Mark Disney, On The Edge, August 2007)
The only US/UK responsibility under international law is to leave.
Closely
echoing Soviet performance, the US-UK media essentially never challenge
the fundamental and obvious illegality of both invasions, focusing also
on "mistakes". Reviewing the situation in Iraq, Timothy Garton Ash
wrote in the Guardian:
"... the question being asked here
[Washington], even by staunch Republicans who share the president's
goals, is: why has the Bush administration been so incompetent?"
(Garton Ash, 'Iraq's government has failed, but America's isn't doing
so well either,' The Guardian, September 6, 2007)
For Garton
Ash, as for most Guardian commentators, the key issue is
"incompetence", not the supreme criminality that is the waging of a war
of aggression.
On August 20, 2007, the New York Times website
linked to an article titled, 'The Good War, Still to Be Won,' with the
synopsis: "We will never know just how much better the fight in
Afghanistan might be going if it had been managed more competently over
the past six years." (New York Times, August 20, 2007)
This
closely echoes Soviet media performance on the 1979 invasion, where
there was also close to zero recognition of the illegality of the
invasion, as described reflexively in the Western media at the time.
Ironically, contemporary US-UK media are closely matching the Soviet
propaganda they ridiculed in the 1970s and 1980s.
To their
credit, the Soviet media did at least, on occasion, +mention+ the issue
of international law. In their book, The Record Of The Paper, Howard
Friel and Richard Falk note that in the seventy editorials on Iraq that
appeared in the New York Times from September 11, 2001, to March 21,
2003, the words 'UN Charter' and 'international law' never appeared.
(Friel and Falk, The Record Of The Paper: How The New York Times
Misreports US Foreign Policy, Verso, 2004, p.15)
We asked Hugh
Sykes, a BBC journalist reporting from Baghdad, for his opinion on the
issue of legality in relation to the invasion of Iraq. Sykes replied:
"The Americans et al always say they are here 'at the invitation of the democratically elected Iraqi government'.
"It certainly WAS an illegal occupation before the elections in 2005, but is it still illegal?
"I
tend not to put phrases like that into reports because I think I should
stick to reporting events and providing analysis when asked." (Email to
Media Lens, September 9, 2007)
Imagine a comparable comment from a BBC journalist in the 1980s:
'The
Soviets et al always say they are here 'at the invitation of the
democratically elected Afghan government'. It certainly WAS an illegal
occupation before... but is it still illegal?'
In fact, of
course, Western reporters were never in doubt about the truth of the
Soviet invasion. When we conducted a search of newspaper archives, we
found, for example, dozens of media references in the 1980s to the
Soviet "puppet government" in Kabul. The New York Times commented in
1988:
"Soviet troop withdrawal will leave behind a puppet
Government whose ministries are laced with Soviet ''advisers.'" (A.M.
Rosenthal, 'The great game goes on,' New York Times, February 12, 1988)
In February 1990, Tony Allen-Mills reported for the Independent:
"Many
former freedom fighters have made their peace with the puppet
government left behind by the departing Soviet army." (Allen-Mills, Out
of Kabul: 'Why pride must not come before a Najibullah fall,' The
Independent, February 19, 1990)
By contrast, the same newspaper reported of the Taliban in June 2006:
"Their
focus is the 'puppet' government of Mr Karzai and its complicity in
what is portrayed as the Western military persecution of ordinary
Afghans." (Tom Coghlan, 'Karzai questions Nato campaign as Taliban
takes to hi-tech propaganda,' The Independent, June 23, 2006)
Readers
will search long and hard before they find an example of a news
reporter describing the current Afghan government as a "puppet
government" without the use of inverted commas.
As for the idea
that BBC journalists avoid controversial "phrases" and merely "stick to
reporting events", the day after Sykes' reply the BBC website observed:
"The
surge was designed to allow space for political reconciliation..." ('US
surge "failure" says Iraq poll, BBC online, September 10, 2007;
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6983841.stm)
It is
not, in fact, less controversial to suggest that the massive increase
in US violence "was designed to allow space for political
reconciliation", than it is to argue that the invasion was illegal.
Part 2 will follow shortly...
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The writer Simon Louvish once told the story of a group of Soviets touring the United States before the age of glasnost. After reading the newspapers and watching TV, they were amazed to find that, on the big issues, all the opinions were the same. 
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