|
Turkey and Latin America: Reaction and Revolution
by James Petras
 Turkey and Latin America have experienced many similar historical and contemporary political processes and socio-economic changes despite significant cultural and historical differences.
For example, Turkey is the center of a former empire, an Islamic country and member of NATO — Latin America is none of those. For purposes of this article, I want to focus on the contemporary socio-economic and political similarities and differences.
Both Turkey and Latin America have passed form
bourgeois-national-statist development models beginning during the
1930s and ending approximately in the latter half of the 20th century.
Both Turkey and most countries of Latin America have been ruled by
neoliberal regimes. Neoliberalism came to Latin America a decade
earlier (1970s) and more intensely than Turkey (1980), but has produced
very similar class polarizations. In both areas neoliberalism has led
to massive privatizations and the denationalization of banks, industry,
telecommunications and other strategic sectors. The process of
neoliberalization has passed through three phases in both regions.
The first phase of neoliberalism took place shortly after a
military coup. Privatization was accompanied by massive corruption,
crises, deepening inequalities and the emergence of a kleptocratic
state.
The second wave of neoliberalism emerging from the
corruption and decadence of the preceding phase was characterized by
greater dependence on the IMF and World Bank and attempts to accelerate
privatization through stabilization programs to create the bases for
the large-scale, long-term invasion of foreign capital.
The
third wave of neoliberalism began in the new millennium with the coming
to power of neoliberals who combine deepening subordination to foreign
capital with ‘poverty programs’ to neutralize popular opposition and
incentives to activate the provincial ‘national bourgeoisie.’
In
Latin America the first wave of neoliberalism coincides with the
military dictatorships of Chile’s Pinochet (1973-1989), Argentine
Generals (1976-1984), Uruguay (1972-1985), Bolivia (1971-1984) and Peru
(1991-2001). In Turkey the comparable period is the military coup
(1980), the military-civilian regime of Turgut Ozal (1983-89) and the
unstable coalition regimes from1990-1999.
These regimes laid the
groundwork for the neoliberal counter-revolution, by violently
suppressing all popular, socialist and militant trade unions, parties
and movements. The first wave neoliberals created the beachheads for
future large-scale privatization. Because of massive corruption,
mismanagement, incompetence and internal political conflicts, combined
with inflation and popular revulsion, the first wave neoliberal regimes
went into crisis, leading to the second wave of neoliberalism.
The
second wave of neoliberal regimes in Latin America combined greater
dependence on the IMF, a government of technocrats, finance capital
with policies designed to reduce inflation in order to attract foreign
capital.
In Turkey, the second wave of neoliberalism includes the
Bulent-Ecevit-Kemal Dervis regimes (especially March 2001-August 2002)
and the first government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan (2003-2007).
In Latin
America this second wave coincides with the rise of ex-populists and
ex-Marxists turned neoliberals who criticized neoliberalism in their
election campaigns but who deepened and extended privatization and
de-nationalization once in power. In Argentina, the Peronist President
Menem (1980-1989), Brazil ’s Cardoso (1994-2002), Peru ’s Toledo
(2001-2006) and Alwyn and Lagos in Chile (1990-2005) represented this
trend.
The second wave of neoliberalism in Latin America led to a major
crisis and breakdown, leading to popular revolts and the overthrow of
several neoliberal presidents in Ecuador (2000, 2003 and 2005),
Argentina (2001), and Bolivia (2003 and 2005) as well as the election
of radical nationalist populist Hugo Chavez in Venezuela (1999).
In
Turkey, the crisis of 1999-2001 led to the election of Ecevit who
proceeded to subordinate Turkey to the IMF and appointed former World
Bank official Kemal Dervis as Minister of the Economy. Turkey ’s 2001
economic crisis, unlike Latin America, did not lead to a massive
popular uprising.
Despite this important difference, the crisis of
neoliberalism both in Latin America and Turkey led to the rise of
pseudo-populist neoliberals (the ‘third wave’), who combined a
‘welfare’ ideology and promotion of the ‘national bourgeoisie’ with the
privatization and de-nationalization of all strategic sectors of the
economy.
Erdogan in Turkey, Lula in Brazil and Kitchner in
Argentina, all combine a rhetoric of social paternalism with right-wing
‘free market’ practices.
The third wave of neoliberalism has
benefited from high world market prices for export commodities (metals,
agricultural products, energy etc.) and an expanding world economy. But
the internal class, ethnic and regional inequalities have deepened.
In
Turkey and Latin America the current neoliberal presidents (unlike the
past) have several advantages: they have well-organized party
apparatuses which reach into popular sectors, have well-funded
‘welfare’ or ‘poverty’ programs to buy the votes of the poorest classes
and have been able to disarticulate the left through co-option and
selective repression.
Nevertheless, the third wave of
neoliberalism faces several severe challenges from within and below and
from the appearance of a successful alternative model. In Latin
America, the advance of Venezuela’s President Chavez on the road to
‘21st century socialism’ with the nationalization of petroleum,
telecommunications and massive free health and education programs has
secured widespread popular support from the Latin American masses.
Chavez’ progressive socializing policies successfully refute the
propaganda that neoliberalism is the ‘only alternative.’ Secondly,
major movements of trade unions, urban poor and peasants are on the
move again — in Brazil the landless rural workers and public employee
unions are now in opposition to Lula. In Argentina and Chile, the
teachers and other public sector unions are demanding a greater share
of the growing revenue of the state. In Bolivia, President Evo Morales
is pressured by the right wing oligarchy and by leftist workers: he
must turn left or face defeat by the right. In Ecuador and Peru, the
mass movements through massive public demonstrations are challenging
the reactionary social democratic regimes.
Equally serious, the
financial crises of the US and Europe are having a negative impact on
the economies of Turkey and Latin America, weakening the ‘social’
neoliberals.
A new phase of class conflict and social
mobilization is challenging the ‘third wave’ neoliberals. In Latin
America, it has a bold face in President Chavez, a mass base among the
urban and rural poor, and especially with the public employees faced
with budget cuts and privatizations.
In Turkey, the left faces
the task of winning over the millions of poor migrants in the cities
and countryside influenced by Erdogan’s ‘populist’ Islamist image.
However as his regime is clearly dominated by urban technocrats tied to
financial capital — it is only a question of time when the mask of
‘benign conservatism’ falls and the true face of cruel neoliberalism is
revealed.
Despite historical and cultural differences Turkey and
Latin America are part of the neoliberal cycle of expansion and crisis.
Like Latin America, the response in Turkey will depend on the unity of
diverse social forces in a socialist program.
In Latin America the wave
of popular revolts includes peasant, workers, unemployed workers,
indigenous peoples, Afro-Latinos, women, public employees and
progressive Christians. In the Turkish context, popular revolts will
result from the unity of workers, Kurds, Alavi, peasants, urban poor,
People’s Houses, progressive Muslims and public employees.
Fundamental
to the successful outcome of these struggles is opposition to US,
European and Israeli imperialism and their wars against Iraq, Iran,
Palestine, Afghanistan and Venezuela. Anti-imperialist struggles can
only succeed by confronting their local Turkish and Latin American
collaborators — first and foremost Erdogan in Turkey and Lula in Brazil.
James
Petras, a former Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, New
York, owns a 50-year membership in the class struggle, is an adviser to
the landless and jobless in Brazil and Argentina, and is co-author of
Globalization Unmasked (Zed Books). His latest book is The Power of
Israel in the United States (Clarity Press, 2006). His forthcoming book
is Rulers and Ruled (Bankers, Zionists and Militants (Clarity Press,
Atlanta). He can be reached at: jpetras@binghamton.edu. Read other
articles by James, or visit James's website.
 |
Writings 
Subscribe to this comment's feed
