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Can Musharraf Survive?
by Immanuel Wallerstein
Poor Pervez Musharraf! He is not very popular, and is under pressure from just about everybody.
Yet he labors on, seeking to maintain his equilibrium, and his power, while sitting on top of a seething volcano. He has in fact done better than one might have thought possible.
To start the story at the beginning, we have to remember the origins of the state of Pakistan.
Musharraf finds himself stuck in the middle of a struggle between
the US government and the powerful Pakistani Islamists. As the
pressures grow, Musharraf's survival in office is more and more
threatened.
The principal nationalist movement in colonial India was the
Indian National Congress, led by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru.
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, a secular lawyer of Muslim origin, was an active
member. But he increasingly came to feel that Muslims as a group (one
might say as an ethnic group) were relegated to a second-class
citizenship. He joined the Muslim League, a movement seeking
autonomy/independence for a "Muslim" region. In 1934, Jinnah became its
president, and in the final negotiations with the British for the
independence of India, he succeeded in obtaining an independent and
separate status for Pakistan.
On August 14, 1947, when
Pakistan became an independent state, it consisted of several provinces
in the northwest of colonial India and a Bengali province in the
northeast, quite distant from the western sector. On August 11 of that
year, Jinnah made an inaugural speech before the about-to-be
legislative body of Pakistan, calling for an "inclusive and pluralist
democracy," which would guarantee equal rights for all its citizens of
whatever religion or ethnic group. Not only was the Muslim League
essentially a modernist secular nationalist movement, but the armed
forces that would be established drew its personnel from the old
British military forces in India, and its officer corps was equally
secular for the most part.
As we know, independence for
India and Pakistan resulted immediately in terrible inter-group
violence and, among other things, a struggle for the control of
Kashmir. The net outcome of that initial struggle was not only a de
facto (and to this day contested) partition of Kashmir but also a
transfer of populations, such that Pakistan became overwhelmingly
Muslim. In 2007, its population numbers 165 million, which makes
Pakistan the sixth most populous state in the world, and one whose
birthrate is among the highest. This population is today 97% Muslim, of
which 20% are Shi'a.
The political history of Pakistan has
been tumultuous. Its relations with its principal neighbor, India, have
always been tenuous and conflictual. The eastern part of Pakistan
seceded in 1971, with Indian encouragement, to become the state of
Bangladesh. The first military coup occurred in 1958. Civilian rule,
under a largely secular, urban party led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was
restored in 1972, only to be overthrown again five years later. The
coup was led by Gen. Zia ul-Haq who was a quite pious Muslim and
installed sharia as the law of the land. He also had the country
renamed the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Civilian rule was restored
years later under the aegis of Bhutto's daughter, Benazir Bhutto, who
then ceded place to Nawaz Sharif. In 1999, Sharif sought to arrest his
chief of staff, one Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who succeeded in having
Sharif arrested instead and being himself placed at the head of the
government. He was proclaimed president in 2001, and elected to that
post in 2002.
To make sense of this back and forth, we have
to identify the principal political actors inside Pakistan and its
geopolitical alliances. To start with the latter, Pakistan's biggest
concern has always been India, and therefore logically it sought the
support of two states whose relations were reserved towards India
throughout the Cold War -- the United States and China. These two
states considered Indian foreign policy too close to that of the Soviet
Union. The India-Pakistan military strains led both to refuse to sign
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and to develop nuclear weapons,
much to the chagrin of the United States.
Internally, the
situation in 2007 is quite different from that in 1947. Islamism as a
political force has become extremely strong and permeates large sectors
of the armed forces. Islamists are unhappy about Pakistan's links with
the United States, especially during the last five years. The urban,
secular forces would like to force out Musharraf (as well as the armed
forces) from political power and have recently shown their strength in
their successful support of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court whom
Musharraf had tried to fire. The armed forces, while Islamist, do not
really want to cede their role to jihadist elements like al-Qaeda, and
therefore attempt to play a bridge role -- appeasing but trying to
contain the jihadist forces.
When the United States was
supporting jihadists in Afghanistan in the 1980s, its strongest ally
was Pakistan, and in particular the intelligence units of the armed
forces, the ISI. In the 1990s, the ISI helped the Taliban come to power
in Afghanistan. Hence, the ISI was quite unhappy when the United States
overthrew the Taliban and has not been very cooperative with regard to
Afghanistan, something about which Afghanistan's current president,
Hamid Karzai, complains to this day.
It seems quite clear
that, when Osama bin Laden launched the attack against the United
States on September 11, 2001, one of his major objectives, if not his
principal one, was to bring down the regimes in Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia. Why and how so? Bin Laden considered the regimes in both
countries too accommodating to the United States behind their ambiguous
language on Islamism. He expected the United States to put pressure on
the Musharraf regime to engage his homegrown Islamists totally. Bin
Laden's theory was that, if it did so, Musharraf's regime would fall.
Musharraf
has resisted this pressure (as has Saudi Arabia), agreeing with bin
Laden that it was politically suicidal to do what the United States
wanted him to do. On the other hand, he had to keep the United States
relatively happy lest Pakistan lose the crucial economic and military
support of the United States. So, every once in a while, he throws a
bone to the United States, as in the recent assault on the Red Mosque,
a stronghold of Islamists. But he is careful not to go further.
And
this contradiction is what brings us to where we are today. The
jihadists are well installed in the so-called northwest frontier areas
(which have always been de facto autonomous) and Musharraf does not
dare to take real action against them. The jihadists denounce Musharraf
for being too pro-American. The United States, on the other hand,
considers him far too accommodating to the jihadists. The United States
keeps mumbling about direct action. But the United States cannot really
turn against Musharraf entirely, lest an even worse regime succeed his.
Meanwhile, the urban secular classes are pressing a weakened Musharraf
to step down and give way to a truly civilian regime.
Musharraf's
key support, indeed sole support, remains the army. But as long as the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq continue, Islamist political strength
continues to grow. And Pakistan has many nuclear weapons. Should the
Islamists come to unrestrained power, this would pose a real
geopolitical threat to the United States, unlike the invented one of
Saddam Hussein.
Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior
Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author of The Decline of
American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).
Copyright ©2007 Immanuel Wallerstein, distributed by Agence Global
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Released: 01 August 2007
Word Count: 1,197
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Advisory Release: 01 August 2007
Word Count: 1,197
Rights & Permissions Contact: Agence Global, 1.336.686.9002, rights@agenceglobal.com
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Where did you get your quote from the 11th August 1947 speech from? I have the full text of the speech and couldn't find the words "inclusive and pluralist democracy" anywhere.
Sally Kayes, UK